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THE  ROLE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  IN  WORLD  AFFAIRS 
I  am  greatly honoured  to give  the first 
in  the series of  lectures dedicated  to the memory  of 
Samuel  D.  Berger. 
I  remember  him well,  particularly in  the 
early post  war  years.  He  was  a  good  friend of  my  country 
and  a  good  servant of  yours.  To  a  distinguished career 
he  brought  special gifts:  deep  and  sympathetic  knowledge 
of  labour affairs  (in those  days  a  rare quality),  high 
ability as  an  administrator,  and  above  all  a  professionalism 
and  integrity in  the many  tasks  he  performed  in widely 
differing economic  and  political circumstances.  I 
believe that  he  was known. in  the  trade  as Silent  Sam; 
but  this did  not  prevent  him  from  expressing  sometimes 
unpalatable  truths,  notably to the Vice  President  of 
the United States  in 1954.  This  led,  I  believe,  to  a 
temporary  eclipse,  but  as  so  often  on  such  occasions 
his qualities shone  all the brighter afterwards. 
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The  Europe  which  Ambassador  Berger 
knew  after the war  has  of  course  changed  beyond 
recognition.  Before  talking about  the  European 
Community  and its role  in world  affairs,  I  want  to 
say  something about  the wider  Europe,  some  of  whose 
characteristics remain  the  same  as  in  Ambassador 
Berger~s day.  Our  continent  - or rather peninsula 
at  the  end  of Asia  - is still fragmented.  Thirty five 
years after the  war: the eastern half  is maintained 
within  the Soviet  empire  by  troops  which  are at  once 
forward  offensive forces  and  local garrisons.  The 
western  half  formed  itself  into  the  nucleus which  is 
now  the European  Community,  with countries  to  north, 
east  and  south which  are associated with  it in various 
ways.  When  we  use  the word  European,  we  tend  to  mean 
someone  from  one  of  the  ten  Member  States of  the 
Community.  This  is an  understandable mistake  but  it 
is  a  mistake all the  same.  As  General  de  Gaulle 
recalled from  his  school  text  book,  Europe  stretches 
from  the Atlantic to  the Urals;  and  the  Europeans 
of  the  Community  have  not  forgotten  and  always  reckon 
with  the Europeans  to  north,  east  and  south of  them. 
This  dimension  of  European affairs is one  which  we 
neglect  at  our peril.  It was  conspicuous  at  the 
time  of  the Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation 
in  Europe  which  led to  the Helsinki Declaration;  and 
it underlines  events  in Eastern Europe  today. 
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How  do  the  Europeans  from  this divided 
continent  express  themselves?  Obviously  they  do  so 
through the nation states with  which  all are  familiar. 
London  is no  less London,  Paris  no  less Paris  and 
Warsaw  no  less Warsaw.  But  elements of  nationhood 
have  passed to  new collective institutions.  For  defence 
there is the Atlantic Alliance  (with eleven European 
states participating)  and  the  Warsaw Pact;  for  economic 
matters  the Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (eighteen European  states participating) 
and  the  Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance  which 
painfully binds Eastern Europe  to  the  Soviet  Union; 
and  for  finance  the  Bank  for  International Settlements 
and  the  Group  of  Ten  (seven  European  states participating). 
Then  there are  such  looser  gatherings  as  the  Economic 
Summit  meetings  (four  European  states and  the 
Community  participating).  Finally  in  a  class by 
itself the  European  Community,  comprising  ten 
European  states,  and  we  hope  before  long  twelve. 
This is a  complex picture with  aspects 
which relate less to  Europe  and  European  interests 
than  to  the  attitude which  the  Soviet  Union  takes 
towards  its neighbours  and  the rest of  the world. 
Moreover it is a  moving  picture with parts of it 
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moving  faster  than others.  All  European  nation 
states without  exception  have  lost  the  importance 
they  knew  in  the past,  even  as  recently  as  twenty 
years  ago.  Some  are  of  course  reluctant  to recognise 
it,  which makes  the  job of  those  who  deal  with them 
more  difficult.  Those  within  the  European  Community 
have  lost  something  to  gain  something  else;  those 
'. 
on  the  edges of the  Community,  great  attention though 
we  pay  to their interests,  are  conscious  of  the  draught 
which  swirls around  the big trading mass  of  the 
Community;  and  those  on  the Eastern  side are  locked 
by a  combination of  their own  sophisticated caution 
and  the  nervous  rigidity of  the Soviet  Union  into  a 
semi  colonialism more  difficult  and  dangerous  to 
break than  was  British,  French  and  Dutch  imperialism 
in  Africa  and  Asia. 
In  broad  terms,  where  the  Europeans  have 
joined together,  they  have  fortified themselves,  and 
where  they  have  not,  they  have  become  dependent  on 
others  and  been  weakened  thereby.  Even  in  areas where 
there  is an  identifiable European  interest,  the 
Europeans  have  not  always  come  together.  An  example 
is defence.  Americans  and  Europeans  are  of  course 
joined in defence  of  the  North  Atlantic countries  on 
both sides of  the ocean.  There  is a  belief that  an 
effective European  grouping might  be  divisive of 
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the Atlantic Alliance.  I  do  not  think this to  be 
true.  What  is true is that  European  views  on 
defence  have  at  present little collective weight, 
and this at  a  time  when  crucial  defence  decisions 
for  the  next  decade  need  to  be  taken.  By  contrast 
the  area  in which  the Europeans  have  increasingly 
worked  together,  made  the  necessary sacrifices,  and, 
often unwillingly,  surrendered ancient  but  illusory 
elements of  sovereignty is that of  their economic 
activities in  the widest  sense.  From  the beginning 
their aims  have  been political  and  their means 
economic;  and  in both political and  economic  terms 
the Community  already exercises  the weight  which 
is more  than  the  sum  of its parts.  It has  thus 
become  the most  important  interlocutor of  the United 
States. 
It would  be  intellectually tidy to 
see the  Community  as  an  embryo  United States of 
Europe.  But  comparisons  are  dangerously facile. 
The  United States is a  federal  state with all the 
appurtenances  of  sovereign  power  within  a 
constitution  204  and  a  half years  old.  The  European 
Community  is  a  partial association of  ten  ancient 
states,  each with its own  history,  characteristics 
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and  language  (or  way  of  speaking it),  whose 
constitution is not  quite  twenty  four  years old 
and  whose  present  membership  is no  older than  three 
weeks.  The  differences between  the  two  are  so 
greatthat
1analogies are virtually meaningless. 
It is perhaps better to refer to the uniting rather 
than  the united states of  Europe,  and  to  say that 
the direction their evolution  is taking is all their 
own  and  matches  no  federal  or  even  confederal model. 
Anything  I  may  describe  today  was  not  the  same 
ten  years  ago  and will not  be  the  same  ten years 
hence. 
I  would  like  to  say  a, brief word 
about  the  structure of  the  Community  as it has 
been built since  1957.  Our  written constitution 
is the Treaty of  Rome  as subsequently  amended. 
This  represents  a  balance between  respect  for  the 
powers  of  the  Member  States  and  the  grant  of  a 
measure  of  supra nationality in economic, 
legislative and  judicial  matters to our  four 
institutions. 
First there is the  Commission,  of 
which  I  ceased  to  be President  two  and  a  half  weeks  ago. 
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The  Commission  is the  executive  agency  of  the  Community: 
it proposes,  it manages,  but it does  not,  except 
in one  or  two  areas,  dispose.  It enjoys  full 
political  independence;  and  it regards itself as 
accountable  to  the  European Parliament but  not  to 
the  Member  Governments,  although it is appointed 
by  them.  Second  there is the  Council  of Ministers, 
bringing together  the  Member  Governments.  Its 
main  job is to take  the decisions  necessary to 
run  and  develop  the  Community.  Not  surprisingly, 
tension  - sometimes but  not  always  creative  - tends 
to arise between  the  Commission  and  the  Council. 
Third there is the European  Parliament with  some 
clear cut  powers  ~ such  as  to reject the budget 
or  to  dismiss  the  Commission  - but  more  imprecise 
ones  of  an  advisory  and  supervisory kind.  Since 
the direct election of its members  the Parliament 
has  increasingly exercised both its power  and 
influence.  Together the Parliament  and  Commission 
represent  a  European  constituency which  is 
different  from  the  sum  of  national  constituencies 
represented  by  the  Member  States.  Fourth  there is the 
Court  of  Justice whose  principal  job is to  compel  respect 
for  the Treaty  and  interpret the  law of  the  Community.  Its 
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judgements  are  legally binding  throughout  Member 
States  and  can  override national  law  and  bring national 
states to  book.  In  due  course the  Court  may  come  to 
play  as  important  a  part  in  the  history of  Europe  as 
the  Supreme  Court  in the first half  of  the  nineteenth 
century  in the history  of  the United States. 
Beside  those  four  institutions there  are 
two  more  flexible  ones  outside the  scope  of  the Treaty. 
There  is the European  Council,  or  Summit  meeting.  The 
ten Heads  of  State or  Government  with  the President  of 
the  European  Commission  meet  three  times  a  year,  with  a 
very  broad  agenda  and  together constitute the political 
spearhead of  the  Community.  Second  there  is the  loose 
arrangement  of Political Cooperation  by  which  the  ten 
-Member  States  seek  to  coordinate their foreign  policy 
towards  the outside world. 
This  description  inevitably  sounds  rather 
static.  But  I  am  speaking  of  an  organism rather  than  a 
machine.  The  Community  is  young  and  growing  rather  than  old 
and  set  in its ways.  Like all organisms it is growing  faster 
in  some  areas  than others.  Some  parts of  the  Community's 
activities,  such  as  agriculture,  competition  policy  and 
.• 
external  trade,  are  centrally managed  through  common  policies; 
others  such  as  energy,  regional  development,  economic  policy 
and  monetary  matters  are  a  mixture  of  Community  and  national 
competence;  in  yet  other  areas  such  as  transport  and  the  fosterin~ 
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of  advanced  technology  industries,  Community  policies are 
still at  an  embryonic  stage.  There  are  many  catalysts for 
growth  :  I  need  only mention  the  recent  creation of the 
European  Monetary  System with its currency unit  the  ECU, 
and  the  creation,  as  we  hope,  of  a  common  fisheries  policy, 
to  show  the  continued but  uneven  dynamism  of  the whole. 
It is not  always  easy  to work  with  this 
multifarious,  growing  organisation with its changing 
competences  and shifting balance  of  power  between  the 
Community  and  its constituent states.  No  wonder  that 
Americans  sometimes  find  the  Community  exasperating  to  deal 
with,  and  complain  that  the  Europeans  are either  incapable 
of  putting together  a  common  policy or  that if they  have  done 
so it becomes  unnegotiable  and  set  in  concrete.  All  I  can 
respond  is that  we  in the  Community  sometimes  have  the 
same  feeling  when  dealing with  the  agencies  in Washington; 
and  when  the President  has  put  his  thumb  on  a  policy,  that  too 
can  take  on  the  consistency  of  concrete.  Moreover,  we  have 
an  added  dimension  of  difficulty in that  your  executive is 
subject  to  Congress,  and  Congress,  particularly in  the  last 
few  years,  has  strong views  of its own. 
I  was  struck by  a  paper  by  Congressman  Don  Pease 
published  inthe Congressional  Record  of  1  December  last  year. 
In  it he  wrote: 
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"It should be  pointed out  that  the  United 
States  leaders  are  greatly constrained  by 
domestic politics  and  that  the  American 
President  cannot  always  act  consistently and 
unilaterally.  This  fact  has  understandably 
frustrated European  leaders.  The  American 
political system  is unique.  Constitutional 
structure  and  practice make  it one  which  allows 
many  actors,  with Congress  at  the  forefront, 
to participate in policy  formulation  and 
evaluation  .........  It is by  no  means  certain 
that  Congress  will  approve  a  foreign  policy 
initiative to  which  the President  commits  the 
nation." 
Just  substitute the  word  European  for  United States  or American, 
Community  for  President  and  Member  States  for  Congress,  and  the 
same  can  be  said of  the  foreign  role of  the  Community. 
So  we  have  to  learn  to  deal with  each  other 
as  we  are,  and  to  accept  that  high  professional  knowledge  and 
skill is essential  in so  doing.  Here  I  pay  tribute to  the 
exceptional  people  who  have  been  responsible  for  conducting 
relations  between  the  Community  and  the United States during 
my  time  of  office  as President  of  the  Commission  :  on  the 
European  side of  the Atlantic  Ambassador  Hinton  and  now 
Ambassador  Enders  for  the United  States;  and  on  the  American 
side  Ambassador  Spaak  and  now  Ambassador  de  Kergorlay  for  the 
Community. 
I  now  turn  to  the particular political  and 
economic  circumstances  which  determine  the role of  the  European 
Community  in world  affairs.  In  examining  them  I  hope  to  convey 
some  idea of  why  the  Community  acts  as it does.  Then  I  will 
turn  to  wha.t  the  Community  does  in  three main  areas  of 
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policy:  relations with other industrial  countries;  relations 
with  oil producers;  and  relations with  the world  at  large. 
I  shall conclude with  a  word  on  the  kind of  world with which  the 
Community  and  the  United  States will  have  to  deal  in  the 
future. 
The  central characteristic of  Europe  is its 
vulnerability.  I  have  already  spoken  of  the  continuing 
division of  Europe  with its long Eastern frontier  garrisoned 
by  Soviet  forces  (although  more  to keep  people  in  on  their 
side  than  to  prevent  incursion  from  ours).  Unlike  the  United 
States  we  have  a  border  problem  of  such magnitude  that  American 
forces,  by  our wish,  your  sense  of  duty  and  our  common  interest, 
have  never  gone  home,  thirty-five years after the  war.  By 
itself Europe  is not  a  defensible  entity  in  the  conditions  of 
modern  war. 
Next  there is our vulnerability over  raw materials. 
The  Community  has  to  import  75%  of  its raw materials.  By 
comparison  the United States  imports  under  25%  and  the Soviet 
Union  under  10%.  Like  Japan,  most  West  European  countries 
must  import  not  only  the  energy  they  need  to  power  industry 
but  also  the minerals  they  need  for  industry to  convert  into 
manufactured  goods.  It follows  that  Western  Europe  as  a  whole 
and  the  Community  in particular is highly  dependent  on  external 
trade.  The  percentage of  GNP  devoted  to  foreign  trade varies 
from  Community  country  to  country  but  in  some  cases it reaches 
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up  to  60%.  This  means  that  Europe  has  an  enormous  interest, 
even  greater  than  yours,  in the  stability of the  world  economy 
and  respect  for  international rules governing  trade, 
investment,  money  and  other  forms  of  exchange between states. 
There  have  been  suggestions  in  the  past, 
notably  from  Dr.  Kissinger  in  1973,  that  the  role of  Europe 
in  the world  has  become  more  regional  than  global.  For  the 
reasons  I  have  given,  I  believe  this  to  be  misleading.  What 
is true is that  neither  the European  states nor  the  Community 
of  today  exercises political power  commensurate  with  the 
worldwide  network  of  European  interests  and  responsibilities. 
The  Europeans  are  compelled  by  their circumstances  as  well  as 
their history  and  inclinations to play  a  world  role but  they 
do  so  from  position of  vulnerability.  When  Europeans  can 
accurately boast  that  the  Community  inside  and  out  accounts 
for  some  40%  of  the world's  trade,  that  the  population of  the 
Community  is substantially greater  than  that  of  either  the 
United States or  the Soviet  Union,  and  that its heritage  of 
civilisation,  skill,  technology  and  inventiveness  is second  to 
none,  on  the other  hand  it must  be  said that many  of  these 
assets are unfocussed  in  terms  of political and  economic  power 
and  that  the present  Community  could  not,  even  if it so  wished, 
play  that relatively  independent  role  in world  affairs which 
is open  to  the United States,  the Soviet  Union  and  to  some 
extent,  China. 
It may  be  different  in  the  future  as  the  economic 
integration of  Europe  proceeds,with its many  consquences  in other 
/fields -13-
fields.  Today  I  state the  situation as it is. 
Against  this background  I  look  now  at  the 
Community's  relations with its industrial partners.  I 
count  the major  industrial  countries as  the  United States, 
Japan,  most  of .the other members  of  the  OECD,  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  Obviously  our relationship is so  complex  that it 
defies  simple definition.  But  here  the main  instrument  of 
Community  policy  is trade.  Responsibility  for  trade policy 
is  a  Community  competence  and  the  Commission  has  major 
responsibilities.  In  the recent Multilateral Trade  Negotations, 
now  successfully  concluded,  the  Community  spoke  with  one  voice, 
and  showed  what  it could  do  as  a  united  body.  The  negotiations 
were  perhaps  the most  ambitious,  certainly the most  complex, 
ever  launched,  and  in difficult circumstances  - much  more  so 
than  at  the  time  of  the  Kennedy  Round  - the results fully 
justified expectations.  Their  significance  lay  in  setting 
new  and  more  stringent rules  for  world  trade,  and  within  these 
rules substantial trade  liberalisation.  We  firmly  set  our 
faces  against  protectionism and  committed  ourselves  to 
maintenance,  indeed  extension,  of  the open world  trading  system. 
With  our  partners,  notably  the United States  and  Japan,  we  now 
have  to  give  effect  to  the results  and  build upon  them  together. 
The  role of  the  Community  is not  so  precise but 
of  increasing  importance  in  the  less  tangible aspects  of  the 
relationship between  industrial countries which  figure  on  the 
agendas  of  the  successive  Economic  Summit  meetings.  They 
include macro-economic  management  generally,  international 
' 
jrnonecary -14-
monetary matters,  energy  in all its forms  and  ramifications, 
and  relations with  non  industrial  countries.  At  the  Summit 
meetinzs  -::r-:'3  C,:;mmunity  as  such  is represented by  the President 
of  the  Commission  and  the  current President  of  the  Council 
(who  changes  every  six months);  and  the  four  biggest  out 
of  the  ten Hembers  of  the  Community  are  also  represented  in 
their  own  right.  Looking  recently  through  the  declarations 
published after  the  four  Summit  meetings  I  have  attended  -
London,  Bonn,  Tokyo  and  Venice  - I  saw  more  clearly  than 
perhaps  at  the  time  the  developing  character of  the  relationship 
between  industrial countries  and  the  pla~e of  the  Community 
in it.  In  the  Summit  framework,  including preparation for 
and  follow  up  of  meetings,  we  have  a  valuable  instrument  whose 
importance will,  I  believe,  increase  in  the  future. 
The  relationship between  the  Community  on  one 
side  and  the Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  on  the  other is 
hobbled  by  political considerations.  But  lack  of  political 
progress  tends  to  mask  the  growth  of  trade which  under  the 
umbrella of  detente  has  been  significant  in recent  years.  As 
for  the political side,  the Russians  have  never  liked the 
Community.  It spells to  them  the strengthening of  Western 
Europe  and  the  evolution of  an  entity with potentialities 
equal  to  if not  greater  than  their  own.  They  prefer Europe 
to  remain  divided,  and  have  done  their best,  happily without 
success,  to  frustrate  the  process  of  integration.  They  do  not 
even  formally  recognise  the  existence of  the  Community  and  have 
to  deal  with it through  diplomatic  subterfuges.  But  the  way 
/i'n  which -15-
in which  economic  relations  have  developed  on  a  bilateral 
basis between  Western  and  Eastern Europe  is  a  token both 
of  the mutual  advantage  which  both  have  found  (although  I 
would  not  pretend that  the  balance  of  advantage  is always 
equal),  and  of  that  sense  of  a  wider  Europe  to  which  I 
have  already  referred.  This  explains  in  some  measure  how 
it is that  European  policy  towards  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Eastern  Europe  cannot  be  turned  on  and  off  like  a  tap. 
We  saw this with  painful clarity when  with  you  we  were 
considering  how  best  to  put  pressure  on  the  Soviet  Union 
after the  Soviet  invasion of  Afghanistan. 
All  industrial  countries,  of  the  East  as 
of  the West,  have  much  in  common.  As  Mrs.  Gandhi  once  said: 
"To  believe that  a  particular ideological  system at  a  moment 
of  history has  universal  value is  a  superstition".  I  am 
afraid that  a  good  deal  of  intellectual categorisation is 
superstition too,  a  product  of  past  thinking  and  present 
inertia.  We  tend  to  dodge  two  linked issues which  face  all 
industrial countries:  the  need  for  industrial  renewal,  that 
is to  say  the process  of  switching effort  and  investment  from 
old  and  declining  industries to  new  and  technologically 
advanced  ones;  and  the  need  to  accommodate  the  growth  of 
industry  in other parts of  the world  to our  own  economies  in 
fashioning  a  world  system which  necessarily  involves  a  varying 
division  of  labour.  The  industrial tricks which  we  learned 
in  the  past  have  now  been  learned by  others.  Indeed it is in 
our  interest that  they  should  learn  them.  But  it requires  of 
us  readiness  to  accept  change,  and  flexibility  in our  economies, 
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which  so  far  have  been  lacking.  Here  the  Community's 
industrial record is less good  than  that of  Japan  and  in 
certain ways  less  good  than  that  of  the  United States;  although 
it should be  added  that  our  record  in  aid  and  other  forms 
of  cooperation,  which  we  have  worked  out  under  the  Lorn~ 
Convention  which  links  60  countries to  the  Community,  puts 
us  ahead  of  either  in  these  respects.  On  industrial adjustment, 
the  last European  Commission  did its best  to  alert European 
opinion  and  set  in train  the  change  in  direction which  is 
vitally necessary. 
Next  I  look  at  the  Community's  relationship 
with  the oil producing  countries.  Again,  I  must  remind  you 
of  the  Community's  vulnerability.  Although  we  are  less 
dependent  than  Japan  on  Middle Eastern  and  North  African 
oil,  we  still draw  about  40%  of all our  primary  energy 
supplies directly  from  those  areas.  By  comparison  the United 
States  draws  less  than  9%.  The  Community  consumes  2.1  tons 
of oil per  head  a  year,  of  which  86%  comes  from  oil  imports, 
while  the United States  consumes  3.9  tons  of oil per  head  a  year 
of  which  50%  comes  from  imports.  These  figures  show,  if it 
is necessary  to  show,  why  the  Community  is so  concerned  not 
only  about  stability of oil supplies but  also  about  the  problems 
of  the  area  from  which  most  of  the oil  comes.  Our  relationship 
with  the  Middle  East  is not  of  course  one-sided.  In  a 
traditiona:L  area  of  European  interest our  trade  has  greatly 
increased,  particularly in  the  last  few  years.  Europe~n 
products  have  found  new  markets  and  European  service  industries 
have  taken  deep  root.  As  for  the oil producing  countries,  they -17-
have  invested substantially in Western  Europe,  and  in 
economic  terms  our  relationship  has  become  close. 
It is not  therefore surprising - although 
it seems  to surprise  some  people  - that the  Member  States 
of  the  Community,  working  together  through  the  process  of 
Political Cooperation  should  have  sought  to  develop  a 
correspondingly  important political relationship.  There 
is much  common  ground  between  the  process  launched  at  Camp 
David  and  the  ideas set out  in  the Venice  Declaration of  the 
Community  Member  States.  Both  look  for  a  comprehensive 
settlement;  and  both call for  recognition  of  tile  right of 
existence within  secure borders  of all in  the  area,  and  of 
the  legitimate rights of  the Palestinian people.  But  at 
Venice  and  subsequently  at  the  European  Council  at 
Luxembourg  in  December  we  went  a  little further  than  was 
possible at  Camp  David.  We  spoke  of borders  being  guaranteed 
and  of  the readiness of  the  Member  States of  the  Community 
to  participate in such guarantees.  We  spoke  of  the  need  for 
involvement  of all the parties,  including  the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation.  We  drew  attention to  the  problem 
of  Jerusalem.  Since  then  there has  been  a  follow-up  in  the 
form  of  talks with all countries  in  the  area,  and  these  are 
continuing.  We  now  have  to  reflect  and  consider  further  what 
kind of  initiative we  might  take.  Obviously,  we  want  to  work 
as  closely as  possible with  you.  Equally  obviously  we  could 
not  accept  that  Europe,  with its enormous  interest  in  the  Middle 
East  and  its stability,  could or  should  be  excluded  from  helping 
in  the search  for  a  long-term  and  comprehensive  settlement. 
/Last  I  turn -18-
Last  I  turn  to  the world  at  large.  It 
is at  least  curious,  and  perhaps  significant,  that  the 
relationship between  industrial  and  non  industrial 
' . 
countries  has  never  been  given  a  fully  satisfactory definition. 
The  usual  piece of  shorthand is the North/South Dialogue, 
but  the  phrase  is pretty misleading.  We  live in  a 
multi-polar world.  North  talks to  north,  south  to  south, 
east  to west,  and  west  to east.  Even  the  notion  of  a 
dialogue between  developed  and  developing  countries,  or stated 
more  crudely,  between  rich  and  poor,  is misleading.  Some 
so-called developing  countries  have,  as  I  indicated earlier, 
created very  successful  industries;  while  in  some  of  the 
so-called developed  countries  post  industrial  decline 
has  set  in  and  some  of  their regions  have  become 
relatively  impoverished. 
The  truth is that  there  are  no  tidy 
geographical  boxes  in which  to put  the various  interests 
involved,  and  no  easy definitions.  If this is clearer 
today  than it was  ten  years  ago,  it is at  least partly 
because  of  the crisis in our affairs caused  by  the 
continuing rise  in  the price of oil.  Within  two  or 
three  years  traditional categories were  rendered  out 
of  date.  Countries which  had  once  looked  at  each 
other across  the  table  found  themselves  sitting -19-
side  by  side.  Countries previously reckoned  poor 
now  found  themselves  among  the rich.  Perhaps 
more  important  countries which  had  always  been 
poor  now  found  themselves  a  great  deal  poorer, 
with  the  cost of oil alone,  even  with  low  capita 
consumption,  consuming pretty well  all their export 
earnings. 
So  far  the negotiations at  New· 
York  and  elsewhere  to create  a  world  economic 
system more  responsive  to  the  changes of  our  time 
have  been  frustrated.  People  have  exhausted 
themselves  in  long  drawn  out  discussions with 
little to  show  for  them.  This is partly because 
of  the wide  differences of  approach,  but still 
more  because of differences of  expectation.  In 
many  ways  the  problem is too  complex  and  goes  too 
deep  to be  negotiable.  We  have  to proceed more 
slowly  and  less ambitiously,  step  by  practical step. 
/At  the  same  time -20-
At  the  same  time  it is,  in my  view,  no  good  for 
the  industrial countries  to think that  things  can 
continue  broadly  as  they  are,  and  that  disbursement 
of  limited quantities of  aid can  play  a  major 
part  in  coping with the  enormous  and  growing  problems 
of  the greater part of mankind.  Nor  is it any  good 
the oil producers  thinking that  they  can  safely invest 
their profits in  the  industrial countries while 
leaving to the  industrial countries  the responsibility 
and  the  risk of  recycling revenues  from  oil.  Nor  is 
it any  good  the  Communist  countries  thinking  that  the 
problems of  non~industrial countries are  a  kind of 
capitalist plot  and  confining their  own  efforts 
to  sales of  armaments  and  the  struggle for  power 
' . 
and  influence.  Finally it is no  good  the  poorer 
countries  thinking they  can  change  the  rules of  the 
international  economic  order overnight  to their 
advantage,  above all at  a  time  of  industrial recession, 
continuing inflation  and  increasing  unemployment  in 
industrial countries. 
In  this area of  policy the  Community 
has  a  special role to play.  By  history,  tradition 
and  interest it is more  closely linked than  any 
other  industrial  grouping with  the rest of  the world, 
and  in  a  real  sense  is dependent  upon  it.  It has 
fa  close -21-
a  close Treaty relationship with sixty relatively 
poor  countries  through  the  Lome  Convention,  and 
other  forms  of  treaty or association with most 
other countries  in  the world,  including China. 
It neither wishes  to cling to the present  order 
of  things,  nor  to endorse  some  of the cruder 
blueprints for  a  new  one.  It has  a  specific 
contribution to make  not  only  in  terms  of  trade, 
aid  and  other relationships,  but  in helping  to 
promote  the  evolution of  that  new  world  economic 
system which is clearly necessary.  Public opinion 
as  well  as  governments  in the industrial countries 
have  yet  to understand  the  scope  and  magnitude 
of  what  is at stake.  This  year will  be crucial 
with  the  Economic  Summit  at Ottawa  where  these 
problems  w~ll be  high  on  the  agenda,  and  the 
projected meeting  at Mexico  of representative 
countries  from all sides concerned.  Above  all we 
need more  understanding  and  more  readiness to  hear 
other points of  view. 
I  think that  the  fundamental  idea  should 
be  that  of mutual  advantage,  coupled of  course  with 
the idea of  mutual  responsibility.  Industrial  as well 
as  non  industrial  countries,  oil producing countries 
jas well -22-
as  well  as oil  consuming  countries,  state trading 
countries as well  as  those with market  economies, 
will all have  to carry  an  appropriate part of  the 
burden  of  change.  If there will  be  gains  for  all 
there will  be  sacrifices for all.  The  penalties 
of  failure  - social breakdown,  contagious  instability, 
violence  in all its forms  - are worse  than  any  of 
us  in  his right  mind  would  wish  to  contemplate. 
We  are all inhabitants of  one  small 
planet,  and  in the first  as  well  as the last resort 
we  have  to  see  our  problems  in  a  planetary  framework. 
I  particularly welcome  the  formidable  work  undertaken 
in  the United States which  led to  the publication of 
the  Global  2000  Report  last July.  Unlike  other  forward 
looks  into  the future,  it did not  attempt  to  make 
precise predictions.  It set out  alternatives.  It 
showed  what  would  happen  if certain  tendencies  and 
trends were  to continue.  In  short it underlined 
the responsibility we  still have  in  inventing our 
own  future.  Some  of  the possibilities are  indeed 
alarming.  Population  growth,  depletion of  resources, 
pollution of  the  environment,  deteriorating food 
supply prospects will  anyway  make  this last  twenty 
years of  the  twentieth century difficult  and  dangerous 
for  every  human  being.  We  should  I  think have  the 
/philosophy 
' . -23-
philosophy of this Report  in our minds  as  we  look 
at  the world  and  the problems  which  now  beset  us. 
I  have  talked more  in this lecture 
about  global  economic  problems  than  I  have  about 
the  continuing political and military rivalries 
which  bedevil  international relationships.  This 
is  no  accident.  It corresponds with the  role of 
the  Community  in  the world  and  the priorities which 
are  imposed  on  the Community  by  the  circumstances 
I  have  descriQed.  That  does  not  mean  that  I  under-
estimate the  danger  ..,...  the  very real  danger  - that 
mankind  should  one  day  blow itself up  or  irremediably 
poison its environment.  That  hazard is one  we  have 
all had  to face  since the  invention of  nuclear 
weapons.  But  in  facing  it,  we  still have  to  carry 
on  with the  process of living,  of  adapting ourselves 
to  new  circumstances,  of  dealing with other 
problems  and  dangers,  of  creating  a  world  - inventing 
a  future  - more  responsive  to  the  needs  of all 
mankind.  In  this process  the European  Community 
has  a  major  and  growing part to play. European Community 
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Roy  Jenkins,  former  President of the Commission 
of-the European  Communities,  delivered the first 
Samuel  D.  Berger Memorial  Lecture at Georgetown 
University today.  Excerpts  follow. 
ON  ATLANTIC  ALLIANCE: 
In broad  terms,  where  the Europeans  have  joined together, 
they have  fortified themselves,  and  where  they have  not,  they have 
become  dependent  on others  and  weakened  thereby.  Even  in areas 
where  there is an  identifiable European  interest,  the  Europeans  have 
not always  come  together.  An  example is defense.  Americans  and 
Europeans,  are,  of course,  joined in defense of the  North Atlantic 
countries  on  both sides of the ocean. 
There  is a  belief that an effective European grouping might 
be divisive of the Atlantic Alliance.  I  do  not think this to be 
true.  What  is true is that European  views  on  defense  have  at present 
little collective weight,  and  this at a  time  when  crucial defense 
decisions  for  the next decade  need  to be  taken. 
By  contrast,  the area in which  the  Europeans  have  increasingly 
worked  together,  made  the necessary sacrifices,  and,  often unwillingly, 
surrendered ancient,  but illusory,  elements  of  sovereignty is that of 
their economic  activities in the widest sense.  From  the beginning 
their aims  have been political and  their means  ecoDomic;  and  in both 
political and  economic  terms  the  Co~munity already exercises  the 
weight which is more  than  the  sum of its parts.  It has  thus  become 
the most  important interlocuter of the United States. 
ON  GOVERNING: 
It is not always  easy to work  with this multifarious,  growing 
organisation with its changing  competences  and  shifting balance of 
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power  between the  Community  and its constituent states.  No  wonder 
that Americans  sometimes  find  the  Community  exasperating to deal 
with,  and  complain that the  Europeans  are either incapable of 
putting together  a  common  policy or that if they have  done  so it 
becomes  unnegotiable  and  set in concrete.  All  I  can  respond is that 
we  in the  Community  sometimes  have  the  same  feeling when  dealing 
with  the agencies  in Washington;  and  when  the President has  put his 
thumb  on  a  policy,  that too  can  take  on  the consistency of concrete. 
Moreover,  we  have  an  added  dimension  of difficulty in that your 
executive is subject to Congress,  and  Congress,  particularly in the 
last few  years,  has  strong views  of its own. 
ON  DEPENDENCE: 
The  central characteristic of  Europe  is its vulnerability.  I  have 
already  spoken of the  continuing division of  Europe with its long 
Eastern frontier garrisoned by  Soviet forces  (although more  to keep 
people  in on  their side than to prevent incursion  from  ours).  Unlike 
the United States we  have  a  border  problem of  such magnitude  that 
American  forces,  by  our wish,  your  sense of duty  and  our  common 
interest,  have  never  gone  horne,  thirtv-five years after the war.  By 
itself Europe  is not  a  defensible entity in the conditions of modern 
war. 
Next  there is our vulnerability over  raw materials.  The 
Community  has  to  irn~ort  75%  of its raw materials.  By  comparison 
the United States  imports  under  25%  and  the Soviet Union  under  10%. 
Like  ,Japan,  most Nest  European countries must  import not only the 
energy  they  need  to power  industry but also the minerals  they  need 
for  industry to convert into manufactured  goods. 
It follows  that Western  Europe  as  a  whole  and  the  Community 
in particular is highly dependent  on  external trade.  The  percentage 
of  GNP  devoted  to foreign  trade varies  from  Community  country to 
country but in  some  cases it reaches  up  to  60%.  This  means  that 
Europe  has  an  enormous  interest,  even greater than yours,  in the 
stability of the world  economy  and  respect for  international rules 
governing  trade,  investment,  money  and  other  forms  of  exchange  between 
states. 
ON  GLOBAL  ROLE: 
There  have  been  suggestions  in the past,  notably  from 
Dr.  Kissinger  in 1973,  that the role of Europe  in the world has  become 
more  regional  than global.  For  the  reasons  I  have  given,  I  believe 
this to be misleading.  What  is true is that neither the European 
states nor  the Community  of  today exercises political power 
commensurate with the worldwide  network of European  interests and 
responsibilities. 3 
The  Europeans  are compelled  by  their circumstances  as well  as 
their history and  inclinations to play  a  world  role but they do  so 
from  a  position of vulnerability.  When  Europeans  can  accurately 
boast that the  Community  inside and  out accounts  for  some  40%  of the 
world's  trade,  that the population of the  Commun_i tv is substantially 
greater than that of either the  United  States of  the  Soviet Union, 
and  that its heritage of civilisation,  skill,  technology  and 
inventiveness is second  to none,  on  the other hand it must  be  said 
that many  of these assets are unfocussed  in  terms  of political and 
economic  power  and  that the present Community  could not,  even if it 
so wished,  play that relatively independent role in world affairs 
which  is open  to  the United States,  the Soviet Union  and,  to  some 
extent,  China. 
ON  OIL: 
Next,  I  look at the Community's  relationship with the oil 
producing countries.  Again,  I  must  remind  you  the  Community's 
vulnerability.  Although  we  are less dependent  than Japan  on 
Middle Eastern and  North African oil,  we  still draw  about  40%  of 
all our primary energy supplies directly  from  those  areas.  By 
comparison the United States draws  less  than  9%.  The  Community 
consumes  2.1  tons of oil per head  a  year,  of which  86%  comes  from 
oil imports,  while  the United States  consumes  3.9  tons  of oil per 
head  a  year,  of which  50%  comes  from  imports.  These  figures  show, 
if it is necessary  to  show,  why  the  Community  is  so  concerned not 
only about stability of oil supplies but also about  the  problems  of 
the area  from which most of the oil comes.  Our relationship with 
the Middle  East is not of course one-sided.  In  a  traditional area 
of European  interest our trade  has  greatly increased,  particularly 
in the last few years.  European  products  have  found  new  markets  and 
European  service industries  have  taken  deep root.  As  for  the oil 
producing countries,  they have  invested substantially in Western 
Euro~e and  in economic  terms  our relationship has  become  close. 
ON  THE  MIDDLE  EAST: 
It is not therefore surprising  - although it seems  to surprise 
some  people  - that the Member  States of the  Community,  working 
together through  the process  of Political Cooperation  should  have 
sought to develop  a  correspondingly  important political relationship. 
There is much  common  ground  between  the process  launched at Camp 
David  and  the ideas set out in the Venice  Declaration of the  Community 
Member  States. 
Both  look  for  a  comprehensive  settlement;  and  both call for 
recognition of the right of existence within secure borders of all in 
the area,  and  of the  legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.  But 
at Venice  and  subsequently at the European  Council at Luxembourg  in 
December  we  went  a  little further  than was  possible at Camp  David. 
We  spoke of borders  being  guaranteed  and  of the readiness  of the 
Member  States of the  Community  to participate in such guarantees. 4 
We  spoke  of  the need  for  involvement of all the parties,  including 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.  We  drew attention to the 
problem of Jerusalem.  Since  then there has  been  a  follow-up  in 
the  form of  talks with all countries  in the area,  and  these are 
continuing. 
We  now  have  to reflect and consider further what  kind of 
initiative we  might take.  Obviously,  we  want  to work  as  closely 
as possible with you.  Equally obviously,  we  could not accept that 
Europe,  with its enormous  interest in the Middle East and its 
stability,  could or should be  excluded  from  helping in the  search 
for  a  long-term and  comprehensive  settlement. 